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TOURO LAW REVIEW
"[A] governmental classification will not offend the Equal
Protection Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions if it
bears a fair and substantial relation to some conceivable and legit-
imate State interest." 575 Because the state is in control of regulat-
ing and disciplining the classes of professionals listed in the
statute, allowing only specified professionals to represent clients
at state tax hearings promotes the state's interest of ensuring pro-
fessional competence in representation in state tax disputes.
Therefore, the law was rationally related to the state interest
promoted and was constitutional. 576
People v. Blunt577
(decided October 22, 1990)
The defendant, convicted of first degree burglary and first de-
gree assault, contended that his right to equal protection guaran-
teed by the federal578 and the state constitutions579 was violated
by the prosecution's alleged use of gender based peremptory
challenges. Under section 270.25 of the state's Criminal
Procedure Law, 58 0 an attorney can peremptorily challenge a
prospective juror without having to state a reason why he or she
was excluded. The prosecution countered that the defendant, a
male, had no standing to assert an equal protection claim
regarding possible discrimination against women. The court de-
termined that the state constitution, under the equal protection
clause, prohibits the use of gender based peremptory challenges
and held that a prima facie case of improper discrimination was
established. The appeal was held in abeyance and the case remit-
ted to the county court "to hear and report on the prosecutor's
575. Id. at 8, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (citations omitted).
576. Id. at 8-9, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 910-11. For a discussion of equal
protection doctrine under the federal law, see supra notes 454-457 and
accompanying text.
577. 162 A.D.2d 86, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1990), aff'd on remand,
No. 901-05958, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12602 (2d Dep't Oct. 7, 1991).
578. U.S. CON T. amend. XIV, § 1.
579. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
580. N.Y. CPIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982).
332 (Vol 8
1
et al.: Equal Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
EQUAL PROTECTION
exercise of peremptory challenges." 581
During the jury selection process, the prosecutor peremptorily
challenged six women of which two were black. The defense ar-
gued that the prosecution was impermissibly excluding blacks
from jury selection. The prosecution denied defendant's claim of
discrimination, explaining that he was attempting "to insure that
there is a balance including sufficient males on this jury." 582 The
trial court denied the defendant's assertion because the prosecutor
had race neutral reasons for excluding the two black female
prospective jurors. The trial court, however, did not ask the
prosecution to explain why he excluded the four white female
prospective jurors. Subsequently, the prosecutor peremptorily
challenged five more women from jury service, resulting in the
final jury consisting of eight men and four women.
While the defendant asserted equal protection claims under both
state and federal constitutions, the appellate court primarily de-
voted its analysis to the defendant's rights under the state consti-
tution. The court found that the reasoning in People v. Kern,
583
which prohibited race based peremptory challenges under the
state constitution, was applicable to instances of gender discrimi-
nation. The court determined that "[tihere is no basis in common
sense or logic to adopt any other rationale simply because the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is based on gender
rather than race.,, 584 Addressing the standing to sue issue, the
court also found that Kern permitted the defendant to sue even
though he was not a member of the excluded class of prospective
jurors. 585
581. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 90, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 93. On remand, the
appellate division concluded that the prosecutor failed to articulate a gender
neutral explanation for excluding female prospective jurors. People v. Blunt,
No. 91-05958, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12602 (2d Dep't Oct. 7, 1991).
582. Id. at 87, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
583. 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990); see
supra notes 387-410 and accompanying text for discussion of this case.
584. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 90, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
585. Id. at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92. In Powers v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court modified the rule in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
by granting the defendant standing to sue despite not being a member in the
same group that was excluded by peremptory challenge. 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373
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Turning to the case at bar, the court found that the defendant
established a prima facie claim of gender discrimination. The
court, relying on People v. Jenkins,586 noted that even though
four women were present on the jury, a violation of the state
constitution was nevertheless present if it was found that one
woman was peremptorily challenged solely on the basis of her
gender.
Although the Blunt court relied upon the state constitution's
equal protection provision to prohibit gender based peremptory
challenges, presumably the same result would occur under the
equivalent provision of the Federal Constitution. This assumption
can be made because the state constitution's equal protection
provision has been deemed to be the "co-extensive" to that of the
counterpart of the Federal Constitution. 587 In fact, in People v.
Irizarry,588 the First Department of the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division held that gender based peremptory challenges
are prohibited under the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution. 589
Aside from Blunt and Irizarry, there is limited guidance for the
New York State courts to determine whether Batson v.
(1990).
586. 75 N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1990).
In Jenkins, the court of appeals, deciding an alleged Batson violation under
the Federal Constitution, noted that a defendant's equal protection rights are
violated even if only one black prospective juror is excluded solely on the
basis of race. Id. at 559, 554 N.E.2d at 51-52, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.
587. See Esler v. Waters, 56 N.Y.2d 360, 313-14, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094,
452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (1982) (holding that the New York State
Constitution's equal protection clause offers no greater protection than that of
the federal counterpart).
588. 165 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 1990).
589. Id. at 574, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 281:
'For the purposes of equal protection, the constitutional violation is the
exclusion of any blacks solely because of their race. If any blacks are so
excluded, it is of no moment that the jury nevertheless contains a token
number of blacks.' This holding applies equally in the case of the
improper exclusion of any women.
Id. (quoting People v. Jenkings, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 558-59, 554 N.E.2d 47, 51-
52, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14-15 (1990)) (emphasis in original).
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Kentucky590 is applicable to instances of gender based
peremptory challenges. Neither the United States Supreme Court,
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, nor the New York Court of
Appeals have squarely decided the issue.
5 9 1
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Sisario v. Amsterdam Memorial Hospital59
2
(decided March 22, 1990)
Plaintiff claimed that the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules (CPLR) 3012-a,593 "which requires a complaint in a
medical malpractice suit to be accompanied by a certificate of
merit ' 5 94 violated the equal protection clauses of the federal 595
and state constitutions 596 because it protects only a certain class
of health care providers from frivolous malpractice law suits and
excludes other health care providers, as well as other
professionals who are subject to frivolous malpractice claims. 597
Plaintiff also claimed that the statute violated the due process
clauses of the federal598 and state constitutions 599 because it
denies access to the courts by requiring a certificate of merit
590. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
591. Two federal circuit courts were split over the applicability of Batson to
gender based peremptory challenges. Compare United States v. DeGross, 913
F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Batson applicable to gender based
peremptory challenges) with United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding Batson is not applicable to gender based peremptory
challenges), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
592. 159 A.D.2d 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d 989 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 76
N.Y.2d 844, 559 N.E.2d 1287, 560 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1990).
593. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991).
594. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
595. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
596. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
597. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990 ("[p]laintiff claims
that the statute is discriminatory because it affords protection only to certain
health care providers while others who are sued for malpractice, such as
attorneys or accountants, are denied similar protection (as are certain other
health care providers such as osteopaths and chiropractors)").
598. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
599. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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